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Abstract. The cognitive research on reputation has shown several in-
teresting properties that can improve both the quality of services and the
security in distributed electronic environments. In this paper, the impact
of reputation on decision-making under scarcity of information will be
shown. First, a cognitive theory of reputation will be presented, then a
selection of simulation experimental results from different studies will be
discussed. Such results concern the benefits of reputation when agents
need to find out good sellers in a virtual market-place under uncertainty
and informational cheating.
1 Introduction
This paper is intended to collect and re-examine the properties of reputation,
intended as a social artifact, in contexts where information is poor and uncertain.
Since reputation has co-evolved with the human language [5], it should not lose
its human nature even when the substrate on which interaction is implemented
changes.
The dynamics of social systems depend upon interactions among individ-
uals. People can populate their informational domain, that can be defined as
the amount of information available to a society members through gossip, by
communicating opinions and acquired information to other people and, in turn,
getting information from them.
In this context, on the one hand, we have the individual source, based upon
encounters, communications or observations that lead agents to form their opin-
ions and social evaluations. On the other hand, the collective source generates
information that is transmitted from one agent to another without the informers
necessarily adopting it as truthful.
It is a kind of “meta-information” which agents build up thanks to a special
form of social intelligence, the capacity to form and manipulate the minds of
other agents in their minds. This meta-information may be inaccurate, both
because a great deal of information around the evaluation (who is the evaluator,
when and which factors contributed to build this evaluation) is lost and because
the information is passed on without being checked out. Hence, there is a need
for agents to reduce, metabolize and compensate uncertainty.
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In the present work we show the positive effects produced by reputation in
reducing the uncertainty when users are faced with decisions. The effects are
elicited and characterized by means of multi-agent based simulations of a com-
putational model (Repage) which implements a cognitive theory of reputation.
The paper is structured as follows: in the first section, a cognitive theory
of reputation is introduced; in the second section, the cognitive computational
model (Repage) of such theory and the simulation scenarios are discussed. Fi-
nally results of a series of simulations aimed at outlining the capabilities of
reputation in decision making are provided.
2 Reputation Theory
In this section we introduce briefly a cognitive theory of reputation [4] that is
then simulated. More precisely, the reputation theory proposed in [4] introduces
a fundamental distinction between image and reputation in social evaluations.
Both are mental constructs, concerning other agents’ (target) attitudes toward
a given socially desirable behavior, that may be shared by a multitude of agents.
Image is an evaluative belief and asserts that the target is “good” when it displays
certain behavior and “bad” in the opposite case. Reputation differs from image
because it is true when the evaluation conveyed is actually widespread but not
necessarily accurate. Furthermore, reputation circulates within society through
gossip ([3]), that is a communication stream which allows, among other effects,
cheaters to be found out or neutralised. To take place, reputation spreading
needs four types of agents: evaluators, targets, gossipers and beneficiaries. As
an example, the sentence “Silvio is considered an honest person”, includes a
set of evaluators (who adopt the evaluation), a single targets (Silvio), a set of
beneficiaries (the people for which it is important to know that Silvio is an honest
person) and the set of gossipers (who refer the evaluation as such, independent
from its adoption).
Hence, to acknowledge the existence of a reputation does not imply to accept
the evaluation itself. For instance, an agent A might have a very good image of
agent B as a seller and at the same time recognize that there is a voice about
agent B as a bad seller.
Unlike ordinary communication and deception, reputation does not bind the
speaker to commit herself to the truth-value of the evaluation conveyed but only
to the existence of rumors about it. Hence, reputation implies neither personal
commitment nor responsibility over the evaluation transmission and on its conse-
quences. It represents the agents’ opinions about a certain target’s attitude with
respect to a specific norm or standard or her possession of a given skill. The
reputation as described below has been adopted an studied in different contexts
such as e-governance[11], and internet of services [9], the reputation systems [12],
and so forth.
Repage
In this section we introduce the multi-agent based computational model devel-
oped from the theory introduced above. Many other reputation models have been
proposed in the field of agent-based systems such as in [22] [19]; for a compari-
son of these models from the point of view of information representation, refer
to [20]. However, in these models, image and reputation collapse on the same
type of social evaluation. Even when agents are allowed to acquire undirect in-
formation, this will not be represented as distinct from and interacting with own
opinion. As a consequence, there is no way to distinguish known rumors from
shared evaluations, a distinction which is instead central to our theoretical ap-
proach. Reputation co-evolved with human language and social organization as
a multi-purpose social and cognitive artifact [5]. It incentives cooperation and
norm abiding, while discouraging defection and free-riding by (1) allowing re-
taliation against transgressors and (2) cooperating at the level of information
exchange. The various aspects of this theory has been explored by means of
multi-agent based simulation with the Repage Framework [21]. Repage provides
evaluations on potential partners and is fed with information from others and
outcomes from direct experience. To select good partners, agents need to form
and update their own social evaluations; hence, they must exchange evaluations
with one another. If agents communicate only the believed image, the circulation
of social knowledge would be bound to stop soon. But in order to preserve their
autonomy, agents need to decide whether to share or not other’s evaluations of
a given target. If agents transmit other’s evaluations as if these evaluations were
their own, without the possibility of choosing if they want to mix both types of
evaluations or not, they would be no more autonomous. Hence, they must
– form both evaluations (image) and meta-evaluations (reputation), keeping
distinct the representation of own and others’ evaluations, before
– deciding whether or not to integrate reputation with their own image of a
target.
In Repage others can either transmit their own image of a given target, which
they hold to be true, or report on what they have heard about the target, i.e.
its reputation, whether they believe this to be true or not. Of course, in the
latter case, they will neither commit to this information’s truth value nor feel
responsible for its consequences. Consequently, agents are expected to transmit
uncertain information, and a given positive or negative reputation may circulate
over a population of agents even if its content is not actually shared by the
majority.
The main element of the Repage architecture is the memory (shown in Figure
1), which is composed by a set of predicates ([14]).
Predicates are objects containing a social evaluation, belonging to one of the
main types accepted by Repage (image, reputation, shared voice, shared eval-
uation), or to one of the types used for their calculation (valued information,
evaluation related from informers, and outcomes). Predicates contain a tuple of
Fig. 1. Regage Architecture
five numbers representing the evaluation plus a strength value that indicates the
confidence the agent has on this evaluation. Predicates are conceptually orga-
nized in different levels and connected by a network of dependencies, specifying
which predicates contribute to the values of others. Each predicate in the Repage
memory has a set of antecedents and a set of consequents. If an antecedent is
created, removed, or changes its value, the predicate is notified, recalculates its
value and notifies the change to its consequents. What is of interest in the econ-
omy of the present discussion is that in order to make use of Repage’s complex
network of dependencies we need to aggregate social evaluations, by taking into
account what exactly is expressed by the social evaluations.
3 The Virtual Market
The experiments reported in this paper ([14], [15],[18] [16], [13] and [17]) were
performed in a simulated marketplace in which agents can purchase goods by
selecting a seller. This selection is facilitated by the possibility to acquire infor-
mation from other agents about the quality of sellers or about the quality of
other agents as informers. Answers are provided as shared (image) or reported
upon (reputation) evaluations.
The market has been designed with the purpose of reproducing the simplest
possible setting where information is both valuable and scarce. It includes only
two kinds of agents, the buyers and the sellers. All agents perform actions in
discrete time units (turns from now on). In a turn, a buyer performs one com-
munication request and one purchase operation. In addition, the buyer answers
all the information requests that it receives. Goods are characterized by a util-
ity factor that we interpret as quality (but, given the level of abstraction used,
could as well represent other utility factors as quantity, discount, timeliness)
with values between 1 and 100. Sellers are characterized by a constant quality,
drawn following a stationary probability distribution, and a fixed stock, that is
decreased at every purchase; they are essentially reactive, their functional role
in the simulation being limited to providing an abstract good of variable quality
to the buyers. Sellers exit the simulation when the stock is exhausted and are
substituted by a new seller with similar characteristics but with a new iden-
tity (and as such, unknown to the buyers). The disappearance of sellers makes
information necessary; reliable communication allows to discover faster better
sellers. This motivates the agents to participate in the information exchange. In
a setting with permanent sellers (infinite stock), once all buyers have found a
good seller, there is no reason to change and the experiment freezes. With finite
stock, even after having found a good seller, buyers should be prepared to start
a new search when the good seller’s stock ends. At the same time, limited stock
makes good sellers a scarce resource, and this constitutes a motivation for the
agents not to distribute information. One of the interests of the model is in the
balance between these two factors.
4 Discovering Good Sellers
If reputation is a means for finding out material cheaters, i.e. non-reciprocators
in exchange of material goods, how can such a mechanisms be exploited to find
out informational cheaters, i.e. deceitful informants? Solutions to this problem
in the MAS field usually rely on learning strategies (see [25] and [6]), by means
of which agents more or less gradually discover trustworthy informers and gain
accurate information.
Applied to detection of informational cheating, learning techniques are more
efficient than in the case with material cheating, since facing deception in repu-
tation is less costly than trading with a cheater. Here the number of sellers and
buyers is fixed to 100 and 15, respectively. Goods are represented by a utility fac-
tor that we interpret as quality (but, given the level of abstraction used, could as
well represent other utility factors as quantity, discount, timeliness) with values
between 1 and 100.
In Figure 2 the quality of contracts in the simulated environment per sim-
ulation time is shown. In both scenarios (with only image and with image and
reputation) the levels are equals.
On the contrary, the two curves present a different cyclic behavior: in L1 the
the discovering of good sellers come out by information exchange based only on
image circulating in the system. The peaks of each wave in 3 represents, according
to the theory, that, once discovered a good seller, buyers start to buy from this
one. Hence, the distribution of requests is not stable because of the finite number
of stock for each seller. In our view, the minimum value for each wave indicates
a very slow process of discovering when only image circulates in the system.
This result suggests that reputation-based information has a stabilizing effect
in a world of agents that communicate and learn to evaluate one another under
inaccurate information.
Fig. 2. Average quality, against simulation ticks, for L1 (image only) and L2
(image and reputation). Both configurations achieve optimal quality, with faster
L2 convergence
Fig. 3. Good sellers discovered for each turn, L1 and L2. Note the larger spread
and periodical behavior in L1
5 Reducing Uncertainty
In this section the capacity of reputation to reduce uncertainty is discussed and
contextualized. The results are drawn by [15] and [18]. where the authors ar-
gue that not only a large amount of information allows uncertainty reduction,
but also that different sources of information, in particular image and reputa-
tion, contribute to uncertainty reduction. The hypotheses behind the simulation
scenario can be summarized as follows:
– in the domain of social and economic exchange, partner selection is funda-
mental to increase chances of cooperation and quality of products exchanged.
– with image, we have partner selection with either retaliation, which par-
tially neutralizes the good effect of partner selection, but with controlled
information circulating, which reduces the quantity of information available
for agents’ use
– with reputation, we have partner selection with less retaliation and more,
although possibly uncertain, information circulating into the system
– with reputation there is a larger quantity of information circulating in the
system and we expect a decrease of uncertain evaluations, not only for the
effect of the larger quantity of information, but also because meta-beliefs
convert heterogeneous descriptions about a certain target into a synthetic
evaluation.
Fig. 4. Trend of I-dont-know Answers in L1 and L2
When an agent in Repage has not yet formulated (neither by direct experience
(image) nor by undirect information (reputation)) a complete evaluation about a
given target, will provide an “I-dont-know” answer to question about the target.
In Figure 4, the trend of uncertainty, represented by answers of I-dont-know
type, is shown for 100 simulation turns. The curves present a considerably dif-
ferent behavior: in L1, with only image circulating, after an initial faster growth
values stabilize on high levels. This behavior is consistent with the reputation
theory, the main expectation of which being that systems with only image circu-
lating fail to decrease uncertainty. In L2, the trend of uncertain evaluations starts
to decrease after some iterations until it reaches a lower value in correspondence
with the spread of bad reputation.
6 Avoiding Informational Cheating
The functioning of communication-based systems, as any socio-cognitive system,
requires individuals to interact in order to acquire information enabling one to
cope with uncertainty. These systems rely on the accuracy and on completeness
of information. If agents need to be correctly informed, then the quality of infor-
mation becomes a fundamental factor of the global system dynamics. In order to
obtain complete information, agents need to include as many viewpoints as pos-
sibile in their perspectives. Different angles of observation ought to be presented
as objectively as possible. What is the relation between information credibility
and opinion formation? What happens when the informational domains are not
reliable and the trust level is poor? Can false information spread throughout a
society to such an extent that it becomes a prophecy? In the real world, each de-
cision needs strategies to reduce the level of uncertainty in the process of beliefs’
formation and revision with respect to the decision’s consequences. For instance,
the theory of agenda-setting was introduced in 1972 by Maxwell McCombs and
Donald Shaw in [10]. Their studies addressed the effect of media-delivered in-
formation on the presidential campaign of 1968 in Chapel Hill, North Carolina.
Their theory states an existing correlation between information delivered by me-
dia with its consequent perceived importance. Despite the increasing diffusion
of the Internet, which offers a large variety of different sources of information in
a more interactive process of content fruition, traditional media still remain the
major sources of information. Information delivered by the media, in particular
through the news, are perceived by the audience as reliable, as individuals are
not in the position to check information quality. Consequently, the reliability of
providers becomes a matter of trust. The media are bound to exercise a profound
cultural impact on society by affecting both the public perceptions of matters
of general interest and the socalled agenda, the dynamics of public opinion. The
media deeply affect the mental representations of facts and the revision of be-
liefs. Media-delivered information also impacts on the way in which facts are
described. The successive elaboration of information, conveyed through gossip,
inherits the vocabulary, as well as the underlying notions, values, and stereo-
types transmitted by the media. In the following picture (Figure 5) the trends of
the quality of contracts are shown. Here the experimental settings are designed
in a way that the agent’s objective is to reach the maximum quality value in
a contract under informational cheating. The picture shows the average market
quality in the stabilised regime in L1 and L2 for a percentage of cheaters vary-
ing from 0 to 100%. We can observe the different performances of image and
reputation at the increasing number of cheaters: reputation is more sensitive
than image to the increase of cheating, but gives a better average quality perfor-
mance than image does, until the rate of informing cheaters overcomes 60%. For
a comparative analysis, results are presented for the following critical values of
the cheaters’ number: at 0% of cheaters, when only true information circulates;
at 60% when the positive effects of reputation disappears; and, finally, at 100%
when all of the agents are informational cheaters.
7 Conclusions
This paper was intended to collect and re-examine the properties of reputation
as defined in [4], intended as a social artifact, in contexts where information
is poor and uncertain. In particular, it was shown that reputation is a good
means for finding out good sellers: by means of reputation uncertainty can be
reduced and potential cheaters can be inhibited. Since reputation has co-evolved
with the human language, it should not lose its human nature even when the
substrate on which interaction is implemented changes [2,1]. The theory and
the model introduced in this paper should either guide the implementation of
algorithms to compute reputation scores and be useful in analogous decisional
settings. In future works we will approach the definition of other social artifacts
with the main aim to provide detailed, cognitively-sound and non-reductionist
Fig. 5. The curves represent quality in the stabilised regime for L1 and L2.
Until cheaters remain below the threshold of 60%, reputation allows for quality
to reach higher values than happens in the complementary condition. The truth
circulates faster providing social evaluations which are coherent with the reality.
Coherence between information and reality, shared by a larger amount of agents
in L2, increases the trust and the market is more efficient. Over the threshold
of 60false information floods in, hence, social evaluations, circulating faster with
reputation, are often distorted with respect to reality.
computational models which are strictly related with social evaluations (e.g.
opinions [7,8] and their dynamics [24,23]).
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